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ERWIN P. WERNER, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALI·
FORNIA ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS (a Corpora.
_
tion), Respondent.

~"ci

[1] Libel-Damages-Statntol'J Limitation. - Civ. Code, § 48a,
limiting recovery to special damages for libel in a newspaper
. or slander by a radio broadcaster unless correction is demanded
and refused, is not rendered invalid by Const., art. I, § 9, since
the constitutional provision was intended, not to guaranty a
remedy to those injured by the defamation, but only to make
clear that the right of free speech does not guaranty im·
.' t.
munity from liability to those who abuse it.
[!) Id.-Damages-Statuto17 Limitation.-Civ. Code, § 48a, is not
invalid under the due process clause of the United States
·
· ,;
Constitution.
· [3] Id.-Damages-Statnto17 Limitatian.-At eommon law it was
conclusively presumed that general damages resulted from the
publication of a libel, and in enacting Civ. Code, § 48a, the
Legislature could reasonably conclude that recovery of damages without proof of injury constitutes an evil.
: [i] Legislature-Powers.-The Legislature may attack the evils of
·;,i .••. unfounded litigation by abolishing causes of action altogether•
."(1] Libe1-Damages-Statuto17 Limitation.-In view of the con.'" fiicting rules of liability presented by the law of defamation
J.: and the recognition in other situations that the Legislature
, ; may abolish causes of .ction to prevent unfounded litigation,
.~;::. it cannot be said that the Legislature eould not reasonably
conclude that the danger of excessive recoveries of general
clamages in libel actions justi1l.ed limitation of recovery to
special damages when a retraction has not been demanded
and refused.
~' !Sl Id.-Damages-Statutorr Limitation. - The Legislature may
reasonably conclude that the public interest in the dissemina" tion of news outweighs the possible injury to a plaintiff from
the pUblication of a libel, and may properly encourage and
Ii' protect news dissemination by relieving newspapers and radio
;'.: ..tations from all but special damages resulting from defama~, tWn, upon the publication of a retraction.

....

.;;'[11 See 16 Cal.Jur. 128; 33 Am.Jur. 193.

<:lIcK. Dig. References: [1-3,5, 6, 10,12] Libel, § 31; [4] Legis.

mt
'.

17; [7] Constitutional Law, § 61; [8] Constitutional La....,
[9] Constitutional Law, 1156; [11] Constitutional Law,
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[7] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Scope of
InquUy.-1t IS for the Legislllturtl to choose between conflicting policies, and the Supreme COl1rt may not presume that
in reaching a decision the Legisllltllre act.cd on impr?per
motives.
[8] Id.-Due Process of Law.-The Supreme Court. ~annot in-lOke
the due proeeS$ eJau!!e to invalidate a ItlglslatJve policy that
it may deem unwise without exercising judicial censolship
directed. not at tho constitutionality of legislation, but at its
wisdom.
[9] Id.-Class Legislauon.-A legislative classification is reasonable only if thel'e Are differences between the classes and the
differences are reasonahly related to the purposes of the
statute.
[lOa, lOb] Libel-' Damages-Statutol'J Limitation.-The classification of newspapers and radio "tati(\ns apart frum others bears a
reasonable relationship to the objectives the Legislature sought
to achieve by enacting Civ. Code, § 48a, and such legislation
does not violate the equal protection clause of the t'nited States
Constitution and Cal. Const .• art. IV, § 25.
[l1] Constitutional Law-Class Legislation.-The Legislature can
make II elassiflcation for the purpose of applying a statute,
not to the group classifled, but to everyone except that group.
[121 Libel-Damages-Statutol'J Limitation.-In balancing the interests of defamed plaintiffs against the interests of the publio
in the tlillsemination of news alld the avoidance of the dangers
of elcessive general damages, it cannot be said that the Legislature rearhed an nnconstitntional eompromiBe iD enacting
Civ. Code. § 48•. ·

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an ord(>r sustaining a demurrer to
a complaint. Stanley N. Bal11(>s. Judge. Judgment affirmed.
Action for damages for libel. Judgment of dismissal.
afIlrmed.
Morris Lavine for Appellant.
William C. Ring as Amicus Curiae on bellalf of Appellant.
O'Melveny & MyerS, Louis W. Myers, Sidney H. Wall· and
Pierce Works for Respondent.
Price. MacDonald 6: Knox, Harry L. Price, Calkins, Hall,
Linforth & Conard. Reginald H. Linforth. Cooper. White &
Cooper, George A. Helmer, John Hamlyn, Cosgrove, Clayton,
Cramer. Diether, T. B. Cosgrove, Binford & Binford, How-

\

../1

i

)
J

Apr. 1950]

WERNER

v.

SOUTHERN CAL. ETC. NEWSPAPERS

123

(35 C.2d 121; 216 P.2d 8251

ard Binford, Lawler, Felix & Hall, John Hall, Flint & MacKay, H. S. MacKay, Jr., Edward L. Compton, McEnerney &
Jacobs, Garret McEnerney II and Stephen W. Downey, Amici
Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-PlaintifI appeals from a judgment of dismissal of his action for libel, entered upon his failure to
amend his. complaint after a demurrer thereto had been sustained. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendant
published in its newspapers false charges that he had been
convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison therefor, that
' the falsity of these charges was known or should have been
; known to defendant, and that defendant published the charges
:, with intent to injure, disgrace, and defame him. Defendant's
r demurrer was sustained on the ground that plaintiff did not
~, allege that he had complied with the provisions of Civil Code
\~ section 48a- or that he suffered special damage as a result
~,-------------------

" ·"1.

In any action for damages for the publication of a libel in a
or of a slander by radio broadcast, plaintiff shall recover
I' no more than special damages unless a correction be demanded and be
r aot published or broadcast, as hereinafter provided. Plaintiff shall serve
upon the publish13r, at the place of publication or broadcaster at the place
of broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be
libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. Said notice and
demand must be served within 20 days after knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.
;" "2. If a correction be demanded within said period and be not
published or broadcast in substantially as conspicuous a manner in
laid newspaper or on said broadcasting station as were the statements
'elaimed to be libelous, in a regular issue thereof published or broadcast
yithin three weeka after such service, plaintiff, if he pleads and proves
peb notice, demand and failure to correct, and if his cause of action
tie maintained. may recover general, special and exemplary damages;
that no exemplary damages may be recovered unle81 the
11IILlJllwr shall prove that defendant made the publication or broadcast
actual malice and then only in the discretion of the court or jury.
actual malice shall not be inferred or presumed from the publicaor broadcast.
A. correction published or broadcast in IObatantially aa eon!f.I:piclD.otl8 a manner in said newspaper or on said broadcasting atatioD
statements claimed in the complaint to be libelous, prior to
of a demand therefor. shall be of the same force and effect aa
lOch correction had been published or broadcast within three
after a demand therefor.
AI used herein, the termll 'general damagell,' 'llpecial damagell,'
1~8%ef!111,1ar1 damages' and 'actual malice,' are defined as follows:
damages' are damages for 1088 of reputation, shame,
U~~,~tion and hurt feelings;
damages' are all damages which plaintiff alleges and
he has suffered in respect to his property, busin88l, trade,
or occupation, including lIuch amounts of money lUI the
I=:a~;o.~alleges
and proves he has expended .. • result of the alleged
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of the publication. Plaintiff contends that section 48a is un·
constitutional.
[1] Article 1, section 9 of the California Constitution provides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge
the liberty of speech or of the press. . . . " Plaintiff contends
that under this section a person who defames another must
be fully responsible for any damage caused thereby, and that
the substitution of a retraction for all but special damages is
an nncorutitutional attempt to relieve newspapers and radio
stations from full responsibility for the abuse of the right of
free speech. Defendant contends that the abuse clause of
section 9 does not confer on a person defamed a right to the
remedy of damages, but merely specifies that the constitutional
right of free speech does not automatically carry with it
freedom from responsibility for such abuses as were recognized
by the common law or defined by the Legislature. We agree
with defendant's contention. To hold otherwise would result
in freezing the law of defamation as it was when the consti·
tutional provision was originally adopted in 1849.
The quoted provision is an almost exact duplicate of arti·
cle VII, section 8 of the New York Constitution of 1821. Sub·
stantially the same language is found in the constitutions of
43 states. (Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, p. 5,
n. 2.) The remaining states have a shorter guaranty similar
to that in the United States Constitution, in which the
"abuse" exception has been necessarily implied. (See Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470].)
In none of these jurisdictions has the provision been construed
as freezing the law of defamation as of the date of its adoption.
Indeed, its primary purpose is to guarantee that freedom of
speech shall not be restrained except to prevent abuse.
Since 1872 the Legislature has consistently acted on the
principle that it is free to change the law· of defamation.
Many of the amendments have limited or abolished remedies
theretofore available to persons defamed. Thus before 1945,
the year of enactment of section 48a as presently worded, the
Legislature had extended the absolute privilege with respect
to statements in judicial, legislative, and other official proeeedings, and the qualified privilege with respect to reports
of such proceedings (Code Amendments 1873.1874, p. 184);
it had extended the qualified privileges of section 47 of the
Civil Code to fair and true reports of public meetings (Stats.

t,:
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[1895, p. 168); it had enacted the original version of section
v,. 48a limiting the liability of newspapers, when the publication
was made without malice through misinformation and mistake, and a retraction was demanded and published. (See
San Francisco v. Industrial Ace. Com., 183 Cal. 273, 279
[191 P. 26] .) As early as 1886 this court recognized the power
. of the Legislature to extend absolute privileges and thus abolish all remedies for defamation in certain situations. (Hollis
v. Meuz, 69 Cal. 625, 629 [11 P. 248, 58 Am.Rep. 574].)
Moreover, the courts have invoked the applicable code sections
88 amended to determine the rights of the parties without in
any way intimating that the Legislature was powerless to re. duce the remedies available at common law for defamation.
(Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal 59,70 [28 P. 845] ; Ban v. Rawle"
93 Cal. 222, 236 [28 P. 937, 27 Am.St.Rep. 174]; Gosewisck
;r. Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 513-514 [119 P. 656, Ann.Cas. 1913D
] ; Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 799
P.2d 713] ; Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co., 30 Cal.App.
77, 88 [85 P.2d 949] ; Harris v. Curtis Publishing Co., 49
,Cal.App.2d 340, 349, 353 [121 P.2d 761].) Given the view
.that the Legislature has taken of its own powers with regard
the law of defamation and the courts' acceptance of that
it is clear that the abuse clause of the Constitution was
E:lntlendled, not to guaranty a remedy to those injured, but only
make clear that the right of free speech does not guaranty
ijmmllLnit;y from liability to those who abuse it. (See County
Lo, Angele, v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 392
P.2d 773].) Accordingly, section 48a of the Civil Code
rendered invalid by section 9 of article I of the CaliConstitution.
It is also clear that section 48a is not invalid under
process clause of the United States Constitution.
1!",Ii~~JJ" as the Constitution otherwise provides, the Legislacomplete power to determine the rights of individuals.
1Jej~1/.4'U v. Lowery, 25 Cal.2d 561, 568 [154 P.2d 674].)
create new rights or provide that rights which have
lNi;rinl1l111v existed shall no longer arise, and it has full power
0\~egtlla1Ce and circumscribe the methods and means of e.ujoyrights, so long as there is no interference with conllitllLtiOnal guaranties." (Modern Barber Col. v. California
Stab. Com., 31 Cal.2d 720, 726 [192 P.2d 916].)
the Constitution does not forbid the creation of new
. or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common

)
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law, to attain a permissible legislative object." (Siltier v.
Siltier, 280 U.S. 117, 122 [50 S.Ct. 57,74 L.Ed. 221}; Langdon
.v. Sayre, 74 Cal.App.2d 41 [168 P.2d 57].)
There are at least two bases on which the Legislature could
reasonably conclude that the retraction provisions of section
48a provide a reasonable substitute for general damages in
actions for defamation against newspapers and radio stations,
namely, the danger of excessive recoveries of general damages
,in libel actions, and the public interest in the free dissemination of news.
[8] General damages are allowed for "loss of reputation,
shame, mortification and hurt feelings" (Civ. Code, §48a),
but the extent of such injuries is difficult to determine. At
common law it was conclusively presumed that general damages resulted from the publication of a libel. "The practical
result is that the jury may award not only nominal damages,
but substantial sums in compensation of the supposed harm to
the plaintiff's reputation, without any proof that it has in fact
occurred." (Prosser, Torts, § 92, p. 797.) The Legislature
could reasonably conclude that recovery of damages without
proof of injury constitutes an evil.
[4] It is settled that the Legislature may attack the evils
of unfounded litigation by abolishing causes of action altogether. Thus statutes abolishing civil actions for alienation
of a1fection, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of
promise to marry have generally been !lpheld. (Langdon v.
Sayre, 74 Cal.App.2d 41 [168 P.2d 57] ; see, anno. 158 A.L.R.
617, and casescit~d.). ,The purpose of such legislation has
been stated by the New ,York Legislature as follows: "The
remedies heretofore provided by law for 'the enforcement of
actions based upon [alleged] alienation of a1fections, eriminal conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry,
having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to
many persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing,
who were merely the victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their
unjust enrichment, and such remedies having furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime
and in many cases having resulted in the perpetration of
frauds, it is hereby declared as the public policy of the state
that the best interests of the people of the state will be served '
by the abolition of such rf'medies." ( Civil Practice Act,
§§ 61-& et seq.) Similarly it has been held that the dangers

r
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~~.: of unfounded actions based on negligence justify legislative
abolition of certain classes of such actions. •• We are not unaware of the increasing frequency of litigation in which passengers carried gratuitously in automobiles, often casual guests
or licensees, have sought the recovery of large sums for injuries
· alleged to have been due to negligent operation. . . . Whether
·there has been a serious increase in the evils of vexatious litigation in this class of eases, where the carriage is by auto'. mobile, is for legislative determination and, if found, may
be the basis of legislative action further restricting the
. Its wisdom is not the concern of courts." (Silver
T. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122-123 [50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221] ;
·
also, anno., 111 A.L.R. 1011, and cases cited.)
.These cases involved the danger of imposing liability when
had been no wrong. The same principles are applito the danger of imposing excessive liability when no
damages have been proved. Moreover, in the common
of slander, as distinct from libel, there is ample precefor denying any recovery unless special damages are
"All other slanderous words, no matter how grossly
fI::.I.wn.u.I.Jws or defamatory they may be, which cannot be fitted
the arbitrary categories listed above [imputation of a
r·.enl[)US crime or a loathsome disease or affecting plaintiff in
business, trade, profession or office], are actionable only
proof of 'special' damage-special in the sense that it
be supported by specific proof, as distinct from the
...,.IO.,£.ILJ.' damage I presumed to follow in the case of libel or the
umC18 of slander already considered." (Prosser, Torts, § 92,
) Although this distinction between libel and slander
attacked as the irrational result of historical acci"one reason that the law has remained as it stands is
is violent dispute as to the direction in which it
move. Assuming that the distinction between libel
slaIndE!r is a thing without reason and to be abandoned,
four proposals have been made as to the basis on
a'W'IIlcib., the two might be united [only the first two are quoted

To require, in all cases, proof of actual damage as
Iieelnti;al to the existence of a cause of action. This suggestion,
[·C('J.1U'I!Ie. has been a popular one with publishers.
It unwould do away with the serious evil of the. abuse
action of defamation as a weapon of extortion; but it
.'. to the important objection that proof of actual dam-

)
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age is impossible in many-cases where, from the character
of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is almost certain that it must have occurred."
"2. To make all defamation, oral or written, actionable
without proof of damage. This, in substance, is the present
law of Louisiana, where it seems to be administered without
nndue difficulty. Opposed to this is the obvious argunient
that much defamatory language, particularly in the case
of hasty spoken words, is trivial, harmless, and unworthy of
redress; that the opportunities for extortion would be vastly
increased; and that in the interest of freedom of speech some
safety-Valve must be left open for the expression of unflattering views." (Prosser, Torts, § 92, pp. 808-809.)
[6] In view of the conflicting rules of liability presented
by the law of defamation itself and the recognition in other
situations that the Legislature may abolish causes of action
to prevent unfounded litigation, we cannot say that the
Legislature could not reasonably conclude that the danger of'
excessive recoveries of general damages in libel actions j ustified limitation of recovery to special damages when a retraction has not been demanded and refused.
[6] Nor can we take exception to the second basis upon
which the Legislature could justify its limitation of recovery
to special damages, namely, the public interest in the free
dissemination of news. In view of the complex and far-flung
activities of the news services upon which newspapers and
radio stations must largely rely and the necessity of publishing news while it is new, newspapers and radio stations may
in good faith publicize items that are untrue but whose falsity
they have neither the time nor the opportunity to ascertain.
The Legislature may reasonably conclude that the publie
interest in the dissemination of news outweighs the possfble
injury to a plaintiff from the publication of.a libel, and may
properly encourage and protect news dissemination by relieving newspapers and radlo stations from all but special damages
resulting from defamation, upon the publication of a retraction. (See AUm v. Pioneer Press Co. / 4O Minn. 117, 120 [41
N.W. 936, 12 Am.St.Rep. 707, 3 L.R.A. 532] ; Hall, Preserving
Liberlfl of Ihe Press by the Defense of Privilege in Moe'
AcWms, 26 Cal.L.Rev. 226.) Plaintiff contends, however, that
no public interest is served by the publication of false nem
and that it is desirable to enforce full responsibility as a deterrent to careless or malicious publication. He contends that
the statute was enacted, not to eneourage dissemination of

)
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news or to lessen the evils of excessive recoveries. but to grant
newspapers and radio stations special privileges.
Certainly there are forceful arguments in favor of the
policy plaintiff advocates. (See Morris, Inadvertent News'paperlAoel and RetractiO'n, 32 Ill.L.Rev. 36, 45 j Paton, Reform
and the English Law of Defamation, 33 Ill.L.Rev. 669.)
'[7] It is for the Legislature, however, to choose between
l.eon:!1ictllllg policies, and this court may not presume lliat in
J;J:eac:nlIlg its decision it acted upon improper motives. Ie. • • a
must judge by results, not by the varied factors
have determined legislators' votes. We cannot
a search for motive in testing constitutionality."
'_'W"~V. v. Family Secur. L. Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220. 224 r69
550. 93 L.Ed. 632, 10 A.L.R.2d 945J j Goesaert v. Oleary,
U.S. 464. 466-467 r69 S.Ct. 198. 93 L.Ed. 163].)
[8] This court cannot invoke the due process clause to
Y<iUJ'U""" a legislative policy that it may deem unwise without
I'tM[er,eisilnll judicial censorship directed uot at the constittltion~
of legislation but at its wisdom, a censorship whose danMr. Justice Holmes clearly envisaged: "I have not yet
E'A'''"",na1'",lv expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the
increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment
eutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights
"
States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any
but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they
to strike a majority of this Court as, for any reason
ildfmrabl,e. I cannot believe that the Amendment was into give us carte blanche to embody our economic or
beliefs in its prohibitions." (Baldwin v. Missoun, 281
586, 595 [50 S.C~. 436, 74 L.Ed. 1056], dissent.) This
has found increasing acceptance by the United States
,
Court." This Court beginning at least as early as
when the N ebbia case was decided, has steadily rejected
,
process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage
~,cases. In doing so it has consciously returned closer
elOSer to the earlier constitutional principle that states
'power to legislate agai;nst what are found to be injurious
in their internal commercial and business afi'airs,
88 their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal
prohibition, or of some valid federal law. [CitaUnder this constitutional doctrine the due process
'no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress
legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they
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attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions which
they agreed as offensive to the public welfare." (Lincoln Ped.
L. Union v. Northwestern 1. & M. Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-537
[69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6 A.L.R.2d 473].)
"Despite evidence to the contrary, respondents see no evil
to be corrected by this legislation. We are asked to agree
with respondents and call the statute arbitrary and unreasonable.
"Looking through the form. of this plea to its essential
basis, we cannot fail to recognize it as an argument for invalidity because this Court disagrees with the desirability of
the legislation. We rehearse the obvious when we say that
our function is thus misconceived. We are not equipped to
decide desirability; and a court cannot eliminate measures
which do not happen to suit its tastes if it seeks to maintain a
democratic system. The forum for the correction of ill-considered legislation is a responsive legislature." (Daniel v.
Pamily Secur. L. Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 [69 S.Ct. 550, 93
L.Ed. 632, 10 A.L.R.2d 945].)
The responsiveness of a legislature reHects the alertness
of the electorate, and legislation ill-considered in a climate of
indifference may continue to Hourish in such a climate to the
dismay of interested citizens whose numbers may be small.
If these few then turn impatiently to the courts, however,
abandoning the hard task of dispelling the general lethargy,
they accomplish nothing to improve legislation, for if courts
are called upon to set their judgment as to what is wise against
the popular judgment they may summarily put an end to
certain laws that may be foolish but also to certain laws that
may be wise, and particularly to laws that may be wise in
the long run although they_appear foolish at the moment.
"Most laws dealing with economic and social problems are
matters of trial and error. That which before trial appears
to be demonstrably bad may belie prophesy in actual operation. It may not prove good, but it may prove innocuous.
But even if a law is found wanting on trial, it is better that
its defects should be demonstrated and removed than that the
law should be aborted by judicial fiat. Such an assertion of
judicial power deHects responsibility from those on whom
in a democratic society it ultimately rests-the people." (Mr.
Jnstice Frankfurter concurring in A.1!.L. v. American Sash
& D. Co., 335 U.S. 538, 553 [69 S.Ct. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222, 6
A.L.R.2d 481].)
Plainti1f then contends that section 48& violates the equal
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protection clause of the United States Constitution and section 25 of article IV of the California Constitution in granting
to newspapers and radio stations privileges denied to others,
thus depriving plaintiffs defamed by newspapers or radio
stations of rights enjoyed by plaintiffs defamed by others.
These provisions were recently reconsidered in COllnty of
Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Ca1.2d 3i~ r196
P.2d 773], where the court said in quoting from People v.
Western Fru1't Growers, 22 Cal.2d 494 [140 P.2d 13], " 'Proh. (Iems of classification under the California Constitution are
thus similar to those presented by the federal equal protection
of the laws clause of the 14th Amendment. Under either
provision, the mere production of inequality which necessarily
to some degree in every selection of persons for regu1t'lIltl(Jm does not place the classification within the constitutional
The discrimination or inequality produced, in
to conflict with the constitutional provisions, must be
11:7 aCLU~L11'y and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary," or the
' __"_1.,"'.'- determination as to what is a sufficient distinction
warrant the classification will not be overthrown. [CitaWhen a legislative classification is questioned, if any
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
there is a presumption of existence of that state of facts,
the burden of showing arbitrary action rests upon the
who assails the classification.' (22 Cal.2d 494, 506.)"
CaUd 378, 390.)
I
A classification is reasonable, however, only if there
difrer'enl~es between the classes and the differences are
related to the purposes of the statute. (AccountCorp. v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 34 Ca1.2d 186, 190
P.2d 984], and cases cited; see Tussman and ten Broek,
Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 341, 346.)
of principle and in view of my attitude toward
protection clause, I do not think differences of treatlaw should be approved on classification because
cd.i:l'I'eJ'eneeR unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal
ii'\fAMir'Tl clause ceases to assure either equality or protection
is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be
out between those bound and those left free. This
has often announced the principle that the differentiahave an appropriate relation to the object of the
or ordinance. See, for example, Mayflower Farms
E,!!ck, 297 U.S. 266 [56 S.Ct. 457, 80 L.Ed. 675];
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Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 [51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264).
In the latter case a motor vehicle regulation was struck down
upon citation of Illany authorities because 'such a clas:,;ifirEltion
is not based on anything having relation to thE' purposf' for
which it is made;' 282 U.S. 553. 567. If that were the situation here. I should think we should reach a similar eonclusion.·' (Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 115 [69 S.Ct. 463.93 L.Ed.
5331.) It is therefore necessary to determine whether the
classification of newspapers and radio stations apart from
others bears a reasonable relationship to the objectives the
Legislature sought to achieve by enacting section 48a.
It is contended that if the statute is designed to eliminate
the danger of recoveries of excessive geLeral damages, it is
too narrow in that it does not attack the danger generally
but only in litigation against newspapers and radio stations.
Conversely, it is contended that if it is designed to encourage
the free dissemination of news, it is too broad in that its protection is extended not only to thosE' who may in good faith
disseminate defamatory material but also to those who dis·
seminate deliberate and malicious falsehoods. There are per·
suasive analogies, however; that support the validity of the
classification in either case.
[lOa] Certainly a statute cannot be limited to a specific
class without reason. (Missouri, Kansas &- Texas Ry. Co. v.
May, 194 U.S. 267. 269 [24 S.Ct. 638. 48 L.Ed. 971); ct.,
Del Mar Cann~ng Co. v. Payne, 29 Ca1.2d 380 [175 P.2d 231],
with Ferrante v. Fish &- Oame Commission. 29 Cal.2d 365
[175 P.2d 222).) The Legislature could reasonably conclude
that defamation suits against newspapers and radio stations
constituted the most conspicuous example of the danger it
sought to preclude. It is not prohibited by the equal protection clause from striking the evil where it is felt ·most. (Ooesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 [69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed.
163) ; Railway Ex'press Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110
[69 8. Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533).) In considering an analogous
situation involving legislation limiting the right to recover
damages for negligence the United States Supreme Court
said, ". . . there is no constitutional requirement that a regulation, in other respects permissible, must reach every class
to which it might be applied-that the legislature must be held
rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none. [Citations.)
In this day of almost universal highway transportation by
motor car, we cannot say that abuses originating in the multi-
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plicity of suits growing out of the gratuitous carriage of 'passengers in automobiles do not present so conspicuous an example of what the legislature may regard as an evil, as to
justify legislation aimed at it, even though some abuses 1D&7
Dot be hit. [Citations.) It is enough that the present statute
· strikes at the evil where it is felt and reaches the class of cases
where it most frequently occurs." (8iWer v. 8iltJer, 280
U.S. 117, 123-124 [50 S.Ct; 57, 74 L.Ed. 221].) Similarly
· ~ this case, we cannot say that the Legislature could not
· reasonably conclude that because "f the business they are
enf!ragl,(1 in, newspapers and radio stations are the most freobjects of defamation actions and that the danger of
'ex(!ess:ive damages in actions against them is greatest because
their reputed ability to pay; See, Morris, IWtJ6f'ten'
NellOslllap~w LAoel and Retraction, 32 ID.L.Rev. 36, 43; cf.,
_·J~III'.I'n.d v. Moore, 9 Cal.2d 571, 578-580 [71 P.2d 922]. dis.cuing rule of inadmissibility of evidence that defendant is
.'in.." ....tt in personal injury actions.)
. Moreover, in balancing the danger of recoveries of exgeneral damages against leaving plaintiffs with no
E'lI\lfe,~ti'Te remedy for injury to their reputations, the Legis.1tatllre could properly take into consideration the fact that· a
lIJJ~etracti.on widely circulated by a newspaper or radio station
have greater effectiveness than a retraction by an indiand could thus class newspapers and radio stations
"Now, as far as vindication of character or reputation
it stan4s to reason that a full and frank reo! the false charge, especially if published as widely
'. substantially to the same readers as was the libel,is UBU..' in fact a more complete redress than a judgment for
_Illig•• "
(Allen v. Pioneer Press 00., 40 MinD. 117, 124
. 936, 12 Am.St.Rep. 707, 3 L.RA. 532].) "... exilpa1tion in the eyes of the world is not accomplished by
of a judgment on the musty rolls of a court.
jUligIneJlt must be publicized, if those who have read the
to know of its adjudged falsity. Unless the comis both small and interested, 80 that news of the
dglDeIlt is spread throughout it verbally, the plaintiff'.
!bUe&tton depends upon the mercy of the press. The van. defendant may not mention the judgment. Even his
lIjpeti1tol'll-if he has any-may keep silent, out of fear of
M1'It'itri,.,.,. a weapon which may be used against them when
boggle." (Morris, Inadverten' Newspaper lAo"
''''WGl,Uon. 32 ID.L.Rev. 36, 38.)
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[11] The Legislature can ml'.ke a classification for the purpose of applying a statute, not to the group classified, but to
everyone except that group. Thus a Michigan statute prohibits females from acting as bartenders unless they are
the wives or daughters of male owners of bars. In upholding
this statute the Sup~eme Court said, ,. Since bartending by
women may. in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise
to moral and social problems against which it may devise
preventive measures, the legislature need not go the full length
of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of
females other factors are operating which either eliminate or
reduce the moral and social problems otherwisp ('alling for
prohibition~ Michigan evidently believes that the oversight
assured through oWliership of a bar by a barmaid's husband
or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid
without such protecting oversight. This court is certainly
not in a position to gainsay such belief by the Michigan legislature. If it is entertainable, as we think it is, Michigan has
not· violated its duty to afford equal protection of its laws.
We cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively
the mind of Michigan legislators nor question their motives.
Since the line they have drawn is not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse
behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male
bartenders to try to monopolize the calling,'" (Goesae"t v.
Cka"y, 335 U.S. 464, 466-467 [69 S.Ct. 198, 93 L.Ed.
163].) Thus the equal protection clause did not require
Michigan to exclude all women or none from bartending, for
the reasons for exclu~ion were not so compelling for one group
as for the others. SimilaTly. in this case, the Legislature could
stop short of substituting a retraction for general damages in
all cases, because it could reasonably conclude that in those
cases where it did so provide a retraction would be a more
effective substitute than in those cases the statute does not
reach.
[lOb] Section 48a may also be sustained under the equal
protection clause on the theory that its purpose is to encourage
the dissemination of news. Although it extends its protection
to' those who may deliberately and maliciously disseminate
libels, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that it was
necessary to go so far effectively to· protect those who in good
faith and without malice inadvertently publish defamatory
statements. The argument that the statute denies equal protection of the laws because it goes too far is substantially
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akin to the argument that it violates the due process clause
and is equally specious. The legislation abolishing heartbalm suits, for example, was designed, not to protect those who
deliberately or maliciously alienated the affection of one spouse
I. for another, but to insure that innocent defendants will not be
; sued. Again, guest statutes were designed not to protect
, negligent drivers but to insure that innocent drivers will
not be subjected to the hazards of a trial with the possibility
of an erroneous conclusion on the facts. There are many
examples in the law of defamation in which the defendant'l
ltate of mind, his intent, or his negligence is immaterial to
the question of liability. Thus, absolute privilege exempli.
·l1es the belief that in some case the public interest in freedom
of expression outweighs the harm that may be done to the
persons defamed.. (See, Prosser, Torts, § 94, p. 823; Civ.
Code, §47(1), (2), (4), (5).) "The rule exists, not because
malicious conduct of such persons ought not to be actionbut because, if their conduct were actionable, actions
be brought against them in cases in which they had
spoken falsely and maliciously; it is not a desire to preactions from being brought in cases where they ought
, be maintained, but the fear that if the rule were otherwise,
.
actions would be brought against persons who were
l8(~tlJllg honestly in the discharge of a duty. It may be urged,
that a false statement, known to be untrue, and
ldictated by malice, should always be the subject of a civil
But this bald me~hod of stating the question assumes
the untruth and the malice. If by any process of demonfree from the defects of human judgment, the unand malice could be set above and beyond all question
there might be ground for contending that the law
give damages to an injured person. But this is not
state of things under which this question of law has to
Whether statements were in fact untrue,
whether they were dictated by malice, are, and always
be, open questions, upon which opinions may differ, and
can only be resolved by the exercise of human judgment.
real question is whether it is proper on grounds of
policy to remit such questions to the judgment of a
The reasons against doing so are simple and obvious.
.
in judicial proceedings may be utterly free
maliee, and yet in the eyes of a jury be open to that
~utll1ti(l.n; or he may be cleared by the jury of the imputa-
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tion, and may yet have to encounter the expense and distress
of a harassing litigation. With such possibilities hanging
over his head, he· cannot be expected to speak with that free
and open mind which the adminiStration of justice demands."
(Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 Columb.L.Rev.
463, 469-470.)
[12] Oonversely,~ when the primary interest is regarded
as being that of the plaintiff in his reputation, strict liability
has been imposed. (See, Prosser, Torts, § 93, p. 816; and cases
cit.ed.) This imposition of liability without fault, ·even in
cases where actual damage appears doubtful (see, e. g., HultOti flOo. v. JOties [1909],2 K.B. 44, d'd [19101,A.O. 20),
has been forcefully defended on the grounds that ., by attempt by the law to distinguish between the motives of those
who defame others would make the rules too intricate and
provide too many possibilities of escape" (Paton, Reform and
Ike Engluk Law of Defamation, 33 Ill.L.Rev. 669, 670), and
that it is necessary to impose strict liability effectively to
discourage negligent and intentional libels. (See, Morris,
InadtJertent Newspaper liloel and Retraction, 32 Ill.L.Rev.
36,45; cf., In re Marley. 29 Oa1.2d 525 [175 P.2d 832].)
Thus in cases both of absolute privilege and strict liability the importance of protectmg one interest or another
has been considered suf6cient to justify the broadest immunity
or liability to insure the desired immunity or liability. This
court is not in a position to weigh the relative importance of
the conflicting interests involved. and even if it were it should
not attempt to do so. "Oourts can fu11ill their responsibility
in a democratic society only to the extent that they succeed
in shaping their judgments by ratioual standards, and rational standards are both impellonal and communicable.· Mat-.
ters of policy, however. are by definition matters which demand
the resolution of conflicts of value, and the elements of conflicting values are largely imponderable. Assessment of theil:"competing worth involves differences of feelings; it is also
an exercise in prophecy. Obviously the proper forum for
mediating a clash of feelings and rendering a prophetic judgment is the body chosen for those purposes by the people.
Its function can be assumed by this Oourt only in disregardof the historic limits of the Constitution." (Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in A.lI.L. v. American Sask ct D. Co.,
335 U.S. 538, 557 [69 S.Ot. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222, 6 A.L.R.2d
481).)
We cannot S81' that in balancing the interests of defamed
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plaintiffs against the interests of the public in the dissemination of news or the avoidance of the dangers of excessive general damages, the Legislature reached an unconstitutional compromise in enacting section 48a.
•
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
From the writings of the world's wisest men we have the
"assurance "that a good name is rather to be chosen than great
riches, " Proverbs XXII :1 : and

,<

I

:f

"Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls;
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, notbiDg;
i·
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
t,t But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs meo>f that which not enriches him,
J' And makes me poor indeed."
~
(Shakespeare. Othello, Act m, Se. 3)

t·

~ , But

the thief can be' forced to return my purse and its

~ntents, pay all expenses incurred by me in pursuit of it.

and even though he apologizes profusely, he can be sent to
prison for committing the theft. Whereas a newspaper or
radio station may wilfUlly and maliciously defame my repu~
~~tion, hold me up to contempt, hatred, ridicule and obloquy,
:ea.use me to be shunned and avoided, and then by a mere rewhich may not be seen or heard of by more than one
cent of those who read or heard of the defamation, escape
the payment of such out-of-pocket loss as 1 may be able
prove to the satisfaction of a jury, but all others guilty
such defamation may be held liable for exemplary, as well
IS"'A''''''''''' and special damages. This is the effect of the
:.p'u~jOl'ity holding in this case. To say that I can not agree
such sophistry is a gross understatement. I challenge its
rt91llnclnelilS from the standpoint of both reason and authority.
is no doubt in my mind but that the statute here
ib'i'vnl'ITAIl (Civ. Code, § 48a) is unconstitutional in that it trsboth the equal protection and due process clauses of
Amendment to the Constitution of the United
Criminals in California are treated with more unilIO~ity and equality than an innocent plaintiff who has been
The criminal law draws a distinction between.
o

)
j
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defendant who has been gUilty of a crime committed through
negligence and one who has been guilty of a crime committed
with malice. Although the above-mentioned section draws
a very definite distinction between members of the same class,
and to my mind an unreasonable and arbitrary one, it does
not draw any distinction between those guilty of uninten~
tional but negligent defamation and those guilty of wilful
and malicio11l' defamation.
Problems of classification under the California Constitution
are similar to those presented by the federal equal protection
of the law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under
either proviSion, the mere production of inequality which
necesSarily results to some degree in every selection of persons
for regulation does not place the classification within the
constitutional prohibition. The discrimination or inequality
produced, in: order to conflict with the constitutional provisions, must be "actually and palpabZy unreasonable and arbitrary." (People v. Western Fruit Grower., 22 Ca1.2d 494
[140 P.2d 13].) I submit that the legislation in question
makes an actual, palpable, Wholly unreasonable and arbitrary I
classification. Newspapers and radio broadcasts are singled .
out for the extension of a privilege which is not given to
individUalS, magazine publishers, or other periodicals, skywriters, sound trucks, banner-bearing dirigibles, and billboards, and probably television and motion picture producers.
On the other side of the picture, plaintiffa maligned and defamed by those others are given rights and privileges not
extended to plaintiffs who have suffered at the bands of newspapers or the radio.
The majority hold that there are two reasona why the classification made by tqe section is a reasonable one. The ft:rst of
those reasons is that newspapers and radio stations must be
protected against verdicts for excessive damages. Assuming
there is any basis for the asserted danger of awards of excessive damages, just why those two should be protected against
excessive damages any more than magazines, the motion pi~
ture industry, or the others above mentioned, is far from
clear. All are equally able to carry insurance designed to
give such protection.
Moreover, there is no factual or legal basis for the assumption that excessive awards of damages will be made against
newspapers or radio stations. in actions for defamation of
character by individuals who claim to have been libeled or
"andered b7 publications or 'broadcasts. T:be assertion in
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tne majority opinion that juries are disposed to make excessive
awards of damages against newspapers and radio stations in
actions of this character is not only an unjust refiection upon
our jury system, but is. factually and historically untrue.
While the jury system still has its opponents, it cannot be
denied that this system is so firmly embedded in our system .
of jurisprudence that the latter could not survive without it.
It is nevertheless true that ever since the promulgation of the
Magna Charta in the year 1215 to the present time there have
been those who would destroy the jury system. These reactionary minds decry what they are pleased to refer' to as the
'evils of the system, and extol none of its virtues. Thus, the
tendency of juries to award damages to those who have suffered injury or wrong as the result of the wilful, malicious
or negligent acts of others is condemned by these opponents
of the jury system as an evil which should be abated. But
. . should this reactionary philosophy be injected into our system
.. of jurisprudence by permitting its use as a basis for the classi. fication of tort feasors" The answer to this question should
; be obvious to every unprejudiced mind. If the jury system is
.to remain as it has stood for over seven centuries, then it
'should be just as good for the newspaper or radio tort feasor
~. any other, and its tendency to award damages, whether
large or small, should not be made the basis of a classification
:which confers special privileges upon certain tort feasors to
detriment of those injured or defamed by them. History
/JOl!lCluSl.veJ.y disproves the assertion in the majority opinion
excessive awards of damages have been rendered against
IiILew'BP~Lpe:rs and radio stations in libel and slander actions.
,the 55 libelcases'a:ga:iIijCiiewspapers(there are none
-=::co--- radio stations) which have come before this court and
appellate courts of this state which I have been able to
reported during the state's entire history, I find that
,judgments for plaintiff were affirmed. These judgments
follows: Wil8<m v. Fitch (1871), 41 Cal. 363, $7,500;
_~aular(:ts v. San Jose Pro ~ Pub. Soc. (1893),99 Cal. 431 [34
37 Am.St.Rep. 70], amount of damages not specified;
v. McClatchy (1896), l11 Cal. 606 [44 P. 241], $500;
v. Hearst (1897).118 Cal. 366 [50 P. 541], $500; Mizs
(1900), 130 Cal. 630 [63 P. 30], $6,250; Dunn v.
(1903), 139 Cal. 239 [73 P. 138]. $500; Graybill v.
(1903). 140 Cal. 323 [73 P. 1067). $1,000; Bohan
Pub. Co. (1905),1 Cal.App. 429 [82 P. 634], $500;
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Tingley v. Times~Mirror 00. (1907), 151 Cal. 1 [89 P. 1097],
$7,500; Ervin v. Record Pub: 00. (1908), 154 Cal. 79 [97 P.
21, 18 L.R.A.N.S. 622], amount of damages not specified;
Lewis v. Hayes (1918), 177 Cal. 587 [171 P. 293], $1,750;
Waite v. San Fernando Pub. 00. (1918), 178 Cal. 303 (173 P.
591], $3,000; Scott v. Times-Mirror 00., (1919), 181 Cal. 345
[184 P. 672, 12 A.L.R. 1007], $37,500; Newby v. Times-Mirror
00. (1920), 46 Cal. App. 110 [188 P. 1008], $7,500; Earl v.
Times-Mirror 00. (1921), 185 Cal. 165 [196 P. 57], $25,000;
Stevens v. Storke (1923), 191 Cal. 329 [216 P. 371], $1,000;
Lyon v. Fairweather (1923), 63 Cal.App. 194 [218 P. 477],
$750; Gloria v. A Oolonia Portuguesa (1933), 128 Cal.App.
640 [18 P .2d 87], $21,000; Behrendt v. Times-Mirror 00.
(1938),30 Cal.App.2d 77 [88 P.2d 949], $10,000.
The foregoing record belies the assertion in the majority
opinion that there is ·ccdanger of excessive recoveries of gen~
eral damages in libel actions" against newspapers. This
record discloses that during the last hundred years only three
judgments of over $20,000 were upheld by the appellate courts
of this state, one for $10,000, and the remaining 15 for lesser
amounts. True, there were other libel actions in which verdicts were recovered against newspapers, but either new trials
were granted or the jUdgments rendered on such verdicts
were reversed on appeal in those cases. To rely upon such a
record to justify a preferential classification of newspapers
because of the •• danger of excessive recoveries of general
damages in libel actions, H is like a drowning man grasping
at a straw. The majority might, with equal logic hold that
the Times-Mirror Company is entitled to a preferential classification because five of the above mentioned awards, and by far
the largest, were against it. Furthermore, it might with equal
justification be said that the Legislature could limit recovery
to special damages in personal injury actions against rail~
roads and power companies because of the tendency of juries
to make large awards of general damages in personal injury
actions against those corporations because of their reputed
vast wealth. While a majority of this court might be disposed to uphold such a statute, I am disposed to believe that
it would be stricken down by the Supreme Court of the United
States as being in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. I submit that the argument advanced in the majority
opinion in support of its preferential classification of new~
papers and radio stations on the above mentioned ground is
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wholly unsound and utterly lacking in either factual or legal
foundation.
The second so-called reason given in the majority opinion
to prove that this legislation is not a travesty on the equal
protection clause, but is a reasonable classification, is that
newspapers must be free to disseminate news. There is a remote possibility that this reason might hold water if applied
to inadvertent newspeper libel but it can hardly be called
good reason where the problem is one of malicious libel. In
an article cited by the majority (Morris, Inadvertent News·
paper libel and Retraction, 32 Ill.L.Rev. 36), it is pointed out
that in at least 10 states (Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Massa·
. ,chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota,
. ,Ohio, and Wisconsin), statutes purport to lessen the severity
,'of the common law in cases in which inadvertent newspaper
. libel is retracted. All of the statutes apply to libel published
~'1n good faith," leaving the rigors of the common law intact
for the malicious libeler. He points out that "The statutes
be classifted into two groups. In the Drst group the legis.
latures provided that plaintiff shall recover only actual dam·
'ages, but did not define' actual damages.' Courts have inter·
these statutes to mean that non-punitive damages shall
. recovered-with the result that the common law is not
In the second group of statutes, the legislatures
indicated that they intended to eliminate general dam·
In these jurisdictions, either the statutes have been
unconstitutional, or the scope of operation of the statute
been so limited that only trifling, if any, change is effected.
The signiftcance of the legislation is its aim, not its accom·
. . . The statutes all suffer from a common defect.
Bl<'_:lliegislature attempted to eliminate the recovery of general
Why! I submit that the legislators.were impressed
the exculpatory effect of retraction; they recognized
'futility of attempting to vindicate the plaintiff by judgEJ~]lt after retraction, and the folly of taking money from
to further that purpose. They then reasoned
since general damages operate to exculpate the plaintiff
_ ......".... the publisher has not retracted, and since the plaintiff
no need of exculpation after retraction which can be
by a money judgment, general damages should not
when the publisher has retracted. The error in
rea80ning Zies in the fact that general damages are needed
other than exculpation. The assessmenf 01 gen,.
aa1~aes solves an admonitory problem which does Mt
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disappear with retractiQn. So the abolition of general damages is not justified on the ground that the exculpatorr function cannot be served by their retention." [Emphasis added.]
The legislation here involved is certainly discriminatory
in that it protects certain members of a class to the detriment
of others. The requirement of proof of special damages means
virtual abolition of legal responsibility for both inadvertent
and malicious libel. It is a very rare situation where a plaintiff can trace and prove the special damage he has suffered
from libelous matter printed in a newspaper or spoken over
the radio about him. This does not mean that he may not have
suffered sharply-but it does mean that he may never hear of
business opportunities which would have been his had the
"libelous stain" not appeared on his name plate. Those who
read the libel may not read the retraction and if he loses
business or professional opportunities which would otherwise
have been his (although he does not know of them, or ClmD.ot
prove his actual pecuniary loss as to them), he should be compensated for the probable damage he has suffered and that
which he will suffer in the future. Surely Mr. Morris is
right when he says that •• The tendency toward flamboyance
and haste in modern journalism should be checked rather than
countenanced." The interest of the public in news cannot
be said to outweigh the protection which every person is entitled to be given by the law to have his reputation remain
unsmirched througb malice or negligence. Under the holding
in this case, newspapers and radio may freely malign any
person and be liable for only special damages if the plaintiff---.
asks for and receives a'retraction, or if he does not ask for one.
This will in effect allow these two favored means of publication
to escape, in most instances, scot free, since the plaintiff will
not be able to prove the exact special pecuniary loss he has
suffered.
In Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628 [47 S.E. 811, 66 L.RA.
648], the same type of statute was held not to be unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law since ., actual" damages
were held to include aU save punitive damages. Mr. Justice
Douglas, concurring, felt that the statute was unconstitutional
as a denial of equal protection of the law. He said: " . . . I
feel constrained to say that, in my opinion, the so-called libel
act is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it discriminates between
the editor of a newspaper and the ordinary citizen. If I
write a letter libeling an editor, that perhaps, at most, 10
people may see, and he libels me by printing identical charges
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against me that 10,000 people may see, I am subject to pains
and penalties from which he'is exempted by operation of the
statute. Whatever other merits the act may have, I do not
think that such discrimination can be sustained under the
explicit provision of our Constitution • • ."
In Park v. Detroit Free PreS8 Oo~, 72 Mich. 560 [40 N.W.
731, 1 L.R.A. 599], a statute such as ours was held unconstitutional as a violation of due process of law, and the court
said that a person's reputation was a species of property and
that a retraction statute which left him with a remedy only'
when he could prove special damages was leaving him with no
effective remedy inasmuch as special damages were impossible
, of proof in the majority of cases. The same result was reached
, in Bafl.8tn& v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670 [75 P. 1041, 104 Am.St.
Rep. 422, 64 L.R.A. 790]. In MeyerZ, v. Pitn&eer Pub. 00.,
45 'N.D. 568 [178 N.W. 792], the court held that the purpose
,', of the statute was to give the publisher of a newspaper, "who
through mistake or misapprehension in regard to the facts,
in good faith publishes a libelous article, an opportunity to
.retract and thereby, as far as possible, undo the wrong which
he unintentionally did to the party libelled. " It' was held that
the plaintiff, after retraction, could not recover exemplary
, damages, but would be entitled to recover such genel'al or
special damages as would compensate him for the injury
• which remained unsatisfied after the publication of the retrac'tion.
''- As an article in 23 So.Cal.L.Rev. 89 (1949) points out,
J!.ID,g'W1ID and American COUl"ts, :ha:v~ JOJ:lg recognized the ,ad-.
.1,IU.......
of retractionstU> mitigate damages in libel actions.
statute that has attempted to benefit publishers by
,
a retraction for plaintUf's right to recover gendamages in libel actions against newspapers has been
t:,~~-"",ue."'''' on constitutional grounds. Two were held unI~i)nsltitutilonlll as violative of due process and equal protection

)
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IH"a~IWO" v.
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approved in McGee v. Baumgartner, 121 Mich. 287
W. 21, 22]) ; two were judicially rewritten to include
UI~~t:ral damages (Osborn v. Leach, 8upra; Meyerle v. Pione6f'
00., supra), and tn&Zy one was allowed to emerge comunscathed." The one which emerged "completely
I,Ql!lSCatliled" is the Minnesota statute involved in .AZlen v.
5-rtlJ'fl.'!I!"_,,.,,.I!J!J! 00.,40 Minn. 117 [41 N.W. 936, 12 Am.St.Rep.
L.R.A. 532}. cited in the majority opinion. It must
that in the Allen case (decided by a divided toan.
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and sent back for a new trial), the statute involved provided
that the plaintiff could still recover general damages,· even if
Ihe retraction were published, unless the defendant could show
ihat the Ubelous publication was made in good faith and under
a mistake as to. the facts. This holding the majority opinion
.does not mention. It; therefore, appears that the holding of
the majority in this case is in conflict with every decided case
involving a similar statute.
Even if I assume that the majority is correct in stating
that a cause of action for libel or slander was not frozen in
our Constitution (" Every citizen may freely speak, write,
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that right; .•. " [Art. I, § 9]), I maintain
that the person injured by such libel or slander has a cause of
action guaranteed to him by the due process clause of both
Constitutions. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13, and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.) If
the Legislature should abolish causes of action of replevin
and conversion (trover) leaving me thus remediless for the
loss of my car, I would consider that I was being deprived
of my property without due process of law, and I consider
the loss of reputation a valuable property right which can,.
not be taken from an individual without giving him a fully
adequate legal remedy so that he may be compensated, 89 far
as possible, for the loss he has suffered and which he will
suffer from the wrong done him.
We may now assume that the Legislature (pushed by the
powerful pressure_groups which play such a _shameful but
important part in securing the adoption of special privilege
legislation), having succeeded so well with its initial efforts
(present statute held constitutional), may well decide next
that all causes of action for libel and slander shall be abol,.
ished. In this connection, let me point out that the "guest"
statutes and causes of action for alienation of affections and
breach of promise to marry, etc., are not good illustrations of
the power of the Legislature to abolish a cause of action for
an injury. The guest does not have to ride in a car as a
guest, and affection is an iutangible attribute incapable of
possession. From the beginning of time in this count.ry it
has been understood that marriage is a "commodity" that
cannot be forced on men and women. An entirely different
factual situation is presented where an innocent person is
defamed, either negligently or maliciously, and suffers irrep,.
arable injury to his professional, occupatioDal· or busiDt'S8
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reputation because of it. The least that can be done by the
guilty one is to make such reparation in the form of money
damages as will enable the maligned one to live until such
time as he may again build up his reputation.
This court held that a trade-mark and a trade-name are
worthy of protection because through them the owner or
possessor creates and preserves a "favorable reputation," to
stimulate the sale of a product, and to distinguish it from
similar competing products. (Sun-Maid Raisin Grower. t.
Mosesian, 84 Cal.App. 485 [258 P. 630].) Injury to the
standing and reputation of a business becomes an injury
. to the good will of the business, and infringement upon a
trade·mark which results in injury to the good will of the
business may be enjoined. (Hall v. Holstrom, 106 Cal.App.
563 [289 P. 668].) Words which are the subject of the good
will and reputation of a business they designate, are entitled
to the same protection as that afforded to one who has the
prior right to a trade-mark, a symbol, character or words
which have no common meaning and which are artificial.
(Eastern Columbia, Inc. v. Waldman, 30 Cal.2d 268 [181 P.2d
865] ; Barnes v. CahilZ, 56 Cal.App.2d 780 [133 P.2d 433j ;
Hoyt Heater Co. v. Hoyt, 68 Cal.App.2d 523 [157 P.2d 657] ;
Jackman v. Mau, 78 Cal.App.2d 234 [177 P.2d 599]; Weatherford v. Eytchison, 90 Cal.App.2d 379 [202 P.2d 1040].) And
why are damages given in such cases T It is obvious that the
reputation acquired by a business is in large measure responsible for the profits it makes. Why is a tremendous sum spent
every year in advertising the good reputation built up over
the years in the manufacture of certain products' If this
money is lost because busine$S is lost because of the libel or
slander published by a newspaper or broadcast over the air,
has the one so advertising lost nothing in the nature of prop,~, Any professional man's income or profit depends on
JUs. reputation for honesty, integrity, fair dealing, ability and
~~cal practices, and he will suffer in the same indefinite, but
nevertheless very substantial, way by ita impairment or deprivation.
.
rf:trThere is no room for holding, in a constitutional system,
that private reputation is any more subject to be removed by
t¢atute from full legal protection than life, liberty, or propIt is one of those rights necessary to human society
that underlie the whole social scheme of civilization." (Park
~',Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560 [40 N.W. 731,1 L.R.A.
9].) These damages (to a person's reputation) are in the
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nature of a property right j they have been said to constitute
property. (See 17 C.J. 710, 829, 841. See Newell on I.ibel
and Slander, p. 841 j Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 35 Minn. 251
[28 N.W. 708] ; Cruikshank v. Bennett, 30 Mise. 232 [62 N.Y.S.
118] ; Adams v. Scott, 33 S.D. 194 [145 N.W. 446] ; 17 R.C.L.
430, 431; Osborn v. Leach, supra; MeyerZe v. Pioneer Pub.
Co., supra.)
When a cause of action arises it has a legal value as a
chose in action-it i!; a species of property. Even where there
is no legal measure of damages, as in case of slander or assault,
the injured party has an indeterminate right to compensation
the instant he receives the injury. The verdict of the jury
and the judgment of the court thereon do not give, they only
define, the right. Such right, when vested, is to the injured
party, of the nature of property, and is protected, as property
in tangible things, is protected. It cannot be annulled or
changed by legislation, nor extinguished except by satisfaction, release or the operation of statutes of limitation.
(1 Sutherland on Damages, § 7, p. 26.)
In holding a similar statute unconstitutional, as being in
violation of the due process provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution, the Supreme Court
of Kansas said: "From the writings of the world's wisest men
we have the assurance 'that a good name is rather to be
chosen that great riches.' Yet the possessor of this thing of
greatest value, being despoiled of it, is left entirely without
remedy for its loss by the statute in question, except in such
rare cases as he shall be able to show some exact financial
injury in the particulars named." (Hanson v. KrehbieZ, 68
Kan. 670 [75 P. 1041, 1042, 104 Am.St.Rep. 422, 64 L.R.A.
790] .)
From the time of the Declaration of Independence the
people of this country have declared that unalienable rights
are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Both Constitutions (California and United States) declare that no
person shall be deprived of any of these rights without due
process of law. In order to preserve life, in most instances,
it is necessary for men to work that they may provide for
themselves and their families. No member of this court can
deny that a good reputation is something to be highly prized
and cherished. No member of this court can deny that one's
reputation has a great deal to do with the position one holdswhether it be public office, a profession, a business, an occupation, or the social position one holds in his community, his
nate, .. WI - . , . The section of the Oiril Code UDder
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consideration here evidently considers that a retraction published is a fair comperisation for the inestimable, uncountable
damage which newspapers and radio stations are capable of
causing to an innocellt person. A school teacher labeled,
either negligently or Jllaliciously, tLS a communist, may not
lose her position, but she may lose an opportunity for advancement of which she will tiot be aware. A doctor, dentist, attorney, candidate for public office, an actor, actress. &inger, businessman or woman-all of these may lose opportunities, eli- .
• ents, patients, positions, and business, because of the defamation. These lost opportunities will not, in the general course
of events, come to the attention of the loser. He has suffered
a loss for which thedefflJller should pay. The injured person
!,: is not compensated by a retraction which may not be re-ad or
r heard by all who read or heard the defamatory words. We
! have all heard the expression used among our contemporaries
( that "where there is so much smoke there must be some fire."
Since this expression has survived from the days of the Greek
philosophers (Euphues and his Euphoebus. Arber's reprint,
1579) until the present, it would seem a fair assumption that
people will go right on saying and believing it. This court,
in holding this statute eonstitutional, is depriving the injured
person of a property right. As was said in the Hanson ease
~. (supra): "It is suggested, however, that the retraction rei quired by the aet to be published is a fair compensation for
t. the injury done, and a reinvestment of the libeled one with
~ his good name. This being done, all has been accomplished that
~would be by averdiet of a jury, and hence that the retraction
required by the legislative enactment is, if not 'due course
~of law,' an ample substitute for it. It is not an easy task to
deduce either from reason or the authorities a satisfaetory
de:6nition of 'law of the land' or 'due course of law.' We feel
. safe, however, from either standpoint, in saying these terms
~do not mean any act that the Legislature may have passed
~U such aet does not give to one opportunity to be heard before
being deprived of property, liberty, or reputation, or having
tbeen deprived of either does not dord a like opportunity of
a,showing the extent of his injury, and give an adequate rem~.~ to reeover therefor. Whatever these terms may mean
. ore than this, they do mean due and orderly procedure of
~urts in the aseertainment of damages for injury, to the end
. t the injured one 'shall have remedy'-that is, proper
.d adequate remedy-thus to be aseertained. To refuse
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hearing and remedy for injury after its infliction is small
remove from infliction of penalty before and without hearing."
The following statement in the majority opinion deserves
some comment: "Moreover, in balancing the danger of recoveries of excessive general damages against leaving plaintiffs
with no effective remedy for injury to their reputations. the
Legislature could properly take into consideration the fact
that a retraction widely circulated by a newspaper or radio
station would have greater effectiveness than a retraction by an
individual and could thus class newspapers and radio stations
apart. " This argument is clearly and concisely answered
by Professor G. W. Paton (University of Melbourne, Australia) in his article I t Reform and the English Law of Defamation," (33 Ill.L.Rev. 669). Professor Paton states that the
law of torts exists to grant a certain security to a person '8
reputation, physical integrity and good, and, if that secnrity
be invaded, to award damages. The power of the press to
destroy the reputation of an individual is so great that strict
rules are nel!essary to secure a balance. He says that "It is
true that there are speculative litigants whose one desire is to
reap a golden recompense for some fancied slight: that sometimes a person, with no real reputation to lose, recovers damages based on the view that he had a reputation: very occasionally a newspaper has suffered because a fictitious name it has
chosen fits someone in real life. All this is admitted, but the
corollary of the great power of the modern press i.~ a strict
sense of responsibility for the rep1dation of those who lie at
their mercy and, as if is Utopian to consider that such an
attitude of mind can be ind1tced save by the severest sanctions
of the law, strict liaMlity is justifiable by its effect. It must
be remembered that a newspap~r has no professional privilege
to traffic in the reputation of others." [Emphasis added.1
The last statement in the just quoted article is to be found
in libel cases against newspapers decided in this state prior
to the enactment of the legislation here considered. It should
be noted that rather than imposing stricter liability upon
newspapers and radio stations because of the great power they
possess to ruin the reputation of otherI'!. either carelessly or
maliciously, the section provides for a if'sser liability! To illustrate the utter futility of a newspaper or radio retraction,
eonsider the case of a candidate for public office who hu.s been
publicly and falsely accused a few days before election of
having committed several crimes, of being a p<'rson of low
ebaracter and of dishonest nature. He requests a retraction
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which, if time permits, may be given before the election, or
if time does not permit, after the election. He is not elected.
He cannot prove that the libel caused him to lose the election
although he and his advisors are certain it was the cause.
Consider, too, that he has lost the election becau:;e untrue
defamatory matter was widely published about him and that
this may have been done maliciously for that very purpose.
Consider, too, that because of it, the possibility of a favorable
outcome of any future election is very remote. Is this candidate for public office to have no restitution from the one
guilty of the wrong f The majority opinion say~ .. No. .. I do
. not agree.
The majority state that "This court is not in a position to
weigh the relative importance of the conflicting interests invol ved, and even if it were it should not attempt to do so."
It most assuredly is the duty of this court to scrutinize carefully any legislation in order to determine whether it is un. reasonable or discriminatory. The people have the right to
expect that the members of this court will possess the courage
and integrity necessary to declare unconstitutional any legislation which contravenes the rights of the people as set forth
in the due process and equal protection clauses of both Constitutions. This court should invoke these constitutional guarantees to protect the rights of those who are wronged by
.such legislation and should not be servile to any interest or
.influence regardless of the power it wields.
~'. . ' The majority opinion quotes from a dissenting opinion written by the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the case of
,
. v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 [50 8.0t. 436, 74 L.Ed.
, in which he speaks .of the tendency of the court to give
emphasis to the due process· provision of the Fourteenth
~U':J.1U1JI1t:L1L in striking down legislation. Mr. Justice Holmes
not there concerned with a statute conferring a special
,1D'ivile~'p upon a particular group such as we have here, but
. concerned with a taxation matter. I have no doubt that
great liberal minded Mr. Justice Holmes, with his courage,
_,',,,.1,,....... and foresight, would be the first to speak out against
~eciiBI privilege legislation of this character in order that it
be struck down as violathre of both the due process and
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
lilCl'llS1tltlltI<>n of the United' States.
have hereinbpfore referred to pressure groups and their
effect UpOll legislation in this state. By this reference
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I do not mean to cast the slightest reflection upon the members
of the California Legislature, past or present. Both my son
and I have served as members of this body, and I am in a
position to know that. considering the great variety and the
tremendous importance of the problems presented, the time
available for their consideration and solution, and the pressure
exerted by different groups seeking special privilege legisla.
tion. the members of the Legislature render a commendable
public service and are entitled to the confidence, respect and
commendation of the people of this state. But I am not so
naive that 1 do not realize that they may yield to some of the
pressure exerted, and with reference to the particular lcgis.
lation here onder consideration, that that pressure may have
been of a most powerful nature. It is not unlikely that the
constitutional prohibition against this legislation was con·
sidered by the Legislature and that that body concluded that
this was a matter for the courts to determine. It is just as
probable that the Legislature was not favored with the argu.
ments here advanced against thi!: legislation on constitutional
~rollnds before adopting it. Since T feel so strongly that this
statute violates the due process of law and equal protection
provisions of both our state and federal Constitutions, I would·
be violating my solemn oath to support both of these Constitu·
tions if I did not cast my vote as a member of this court to
strike it down-and this I have done.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.

)

SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-It is only in respect to privi.
lege as to deliberately false and malicious publications by newspapers that this dissent is ,:lirected.
I think that there is a substantial difference between, on the
one hand, an inadvertently false defamation and, on the other
band, a ~efamation which is known to be false and which is
wilfully and maliciously published. That difference, it seems
to me, assumes legally significant importance when we examine
the constitutional questions which are raised by the subject
legislation. I agree in large measure with Justice Traynor's
discussion of the constitutional principles involved but I do
not agree that those principles extend to the protection of
the publication of defamatory matter which is known to be
false and which is delibcrately and maliciously uttered.
Justice Traynor says, "There are at least two bases on
which the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the
retraction provisions of section 48a provide a reasonable sub-
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stitute for general damages in actions for defamation against
newspapers and radio stations. namely. the danger of excessive
recoveries of general damages in libel actions and the public
interest in the free dissemination of news."
Considering the above stated two bases in relation to maliciously and deliberately uttered known-to-be-false defamations, I think that their substance completely vanishes. The
first asserted base is "the danger of exce~ive recoveries of
general damages in libel actions." But does the policy of
the state consider, or permit this court to bt'lieve, that there
is any danger of "excessive recoveries of general damages" in
libel actions which are based on knowingly false, deliberate
and malicious publications' Why does the law provide for
punitive damages, as agaif'!'It other defamers, where the matter is known to be false and is deliberately, wilfully and maliciously published' If the state has any such policy as is
suggested for base No.1, why does it provide that in all libel
cases other than against a newspaper or radio broadcasting
company (nnder the conditions specified in Civ. Code, § 48a),
where the conditions of malice, knowledge and wilfulness obtain. that pnnitive damages may be assessed'
Base No. 2 is stated in the majority opinion to be ,. the
public interest in the free dissemination of news. " But surely
the license, whether limited or nnlimited, to wilfully. knowingly and maliciously utter false and defamatory matter docs
not serve "the public interest in the free dissemination of
news"; rather does it tend to defeat that interest by encouraging the malicious dissemination of matter known to be
false.
It is contended, in defenSe of the majority position, that
the legislation can be sustained "not because the malicious
conduct of such persons ought not to be actionable, but because,
if their conduct were actionable, actions would be brought
against them in cases in which they had not spoken falsely
and maliciously . . . And the real question is whether it is
proper on gronnds of public policy to remit such questions to
the judgment of a jury." The example cited in the text as
quoted by the majority opinion is the immunity given participants in a judicial proceeding. The argument is not persuasive to me. The most regular participants in judicial proceedings are judges. Judges of courts are public officers, responsible to the people; while they may not be sued for libel or
alander as arising out of judicial acts, they are not self-
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selected or self-constituted, and they are subject to election
and recall. The people have no such power over newspaper
publishers who, conceivably, can be completely irresponsible.
Likewise, as to other participants (than judges) in judicial
proceedings, there is a fundamental difference between their
relationship to such a public governmental proceeding and the
relationship of a publisher to his private enterprise; so too,
is there a very basic difference between a court, which is an
institution of government, and a newspaper, which is a private enterpriSe. (And it is to be d~voutlyhoped that the
difference shall never be destroyed.)
Furthermore, I think that section 9, article I, of our California Constitution is entitled to more significance in its
application here than is accorded it by the majority. It
provides that .. Every citizen may freely speak, write, and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech or'of the press!' I think that
the clause "being responsible for the abuse of that right"
has aftirmative rather than mere negative significance. I
think that responsibility for abuse of the right is a fundamental part of our concept of freedom of speech and press.
It forms a part of the definition of the very liberty which is
guaranteed. Unless there is responsiblity for abuse of the
right then such right becomes more than a "liberty"; it
becomes a license. The malicious and deliberate publication of
that which is known to be false, uttered for the sole purpose
of injuring the subject, is not, in my estimation, within the
freedom guaranteed' by the Constitution. Rather is such a
. pUblication an "abuse of that right" to which the liberty
does not extend.
I
The courts have been most zealous to protect freedom
of speech and press against prior restraint. There is no accepted principle of constitutional law which suggests that
they should be so zealous to absolve from subsequent responJlibility for a clear abuse of the liberty. Indeed, the very
IJtrictness of the rule against prior restraints bespeaks need of
wbsequent responsibility for abuses.
Even if we assume, notwithstanding the provisions of section 9, article I, relative to responsibility for abuse of the
right, that the Legislature could completely abolish the cause
of action for libel, such assumption does not save the statute
here. The Legislature has not abolished a cause of action;
neither has it undertaken to define an "abuse of that right'"
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for which the publisher may be responsible. If the suojcct
statute had extended the exemption to general damages only
it would be far easier to defend. But by framing the statute
to exempt both general and punitive liability for the most
pernicious abuse to which a newspaper may be put, it seems
that what the Legislature has really done is to create a special
privilege for an arbitrarily selected class. The special privilege is exemption from liability for general and punitive
damages for libel, whether deliberate and malicious or merely
inadvertent, unless a retraction is requested and refused.
The retraction, if demanded and published, may be followed
immediately by a new defamation. By the express terms of
the statute it extends the exemption to include the deliberate
and malicious publication of known falsehoods. Since the
privilege is extended to deliberately false and malicious publications it is, in effect, a license to defame. Such privilege
or license is extended to, and only to, newspapers and radio
broadcasting companies. The metropolitan daily and the
rural weekly have the privilege; United States News and
W orId Report, Time Magazine, Esquire, Fortune, etc., do not.
What reasonable basis is there for giving the "newspaper,"
whether daily or weekly, such license to deliberately and maliciously defame while withholding that license from magazines
of every type' Why should magazines and pUblications generally, other than newspapers and radio broadcasting companies, be subject to punitive as well as general damages for
malicious publications while the special class is exempt'
Assuming that there is a reasonable basis for the c1assmcation
insofar as inadvertent libel is concerned, I find none for such
classification in relation to the special privilege to deliberately
\
defame.
At the beginning of this discussion I pointed out that the
majority opinion declares the proposition that "There are at
least two bases on which the Legislature could reasonably
conclude that the retraction provisions of section 48a provide
a reasonable substitute for general damages in actions for
defamation against newspapers and radio stations, namely,
the danger of excessive recoveries of general damages in libel
actions and the public interest in the free dissemination of
news." It has been shown that both of those bases disappear
when applied to deliberately false and malicious publications.
And there is a still more fatal inadequacy in the majority
position.
The fundamental part of their proposition is that the
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"Legislature could reasonably conclude that the retraction
provisions . .•. provide a reasonable substitute for general
damages in actions for defamation against newspapers and
radio stations. '.' That proposition completely ignores the
element of punitive damages. The statute relieves its beneficiaries from liability for punitive as well as general damages.
What reasonable substitute is provided for punitive damages'
Certainly not the retraction provision. In full compliance
with the law and shielded by it, the publisher could follow
every retraction with a reiteration of the same or a still more
calumnious defamation. There is sound policy behind the law
which provides for exemplary damages in certain cases.
(" [W]here the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud
or malice ... the plaintiff,in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way
of punishing the defendant." (Civ. Code, § 3294.) If this law
is good generally what reasonable basis is there for exempting "newspapers and radio stations" in relation to their
deliberately false and malicious publications'
I reiterate that it is only in respect to the licensing, in effect,
of deliberately false and malicious publications that this dissent is directed. I cannot think that the great body of reputable newspapers and radio broadcasting companies which
serve our country and our people so well would ever stoop to
the vicious practices which the statute would permit. But
there is nothing to prevent vicious persons from entering the
publishing business and from taking full advantage of the·
law as it is upheld. The reputable publishers themselves may
in the long run suffer more from the nefarious practices of
which the law permits and which it encourages than they
would from defending a few libel actions against the unfounded
---charge of falsity and malice.
Since the majority opinion affirms the judgment on the
theory that section 48a is valid in its every element and application I do not discuss whether what I believe to be the invalid portions or applications of the statute could be deleted
and the remainder upheld. Likewise, for the purposes of this
dissent, I accept the implications of the majority that affirmance of the judgment depends on sustaining the statute in its
entirety.
For the reasons above stated I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 11,
1950. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.

